Outcomes of notifications to health practitioner boards: a retrospective cohort study by Matthew J. Spittal et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Outcomes of notifications to health
practitioner boards: a retrospective
cohort study
Matthew J. Spittal1*, David M. Studdert2, Ron Paterson3,4 and Marie M. Bismark1
Abstract
Background: Medical boards and other practitioner boards aim to protect the public from unsafe practice. Previous
research has examined disciplinary actions against doctors, but other professions (e.g., nurses and midwives, dentists,
psychologists, pharmacists) remain understudied. We sought to describe the outcomes of notifications of concern
regarding the health, performance, and conduct of health practitioners from ten professions in Australia and to identify
factors associated with the imposition of restrictive actions.
Methods: We conducted a retrospective cohort study of all notifications lodged with the Australian Health
Practitioner Regulation Agency over 24 months. Notifications were followed for 30–54 months. Our main
outcome was restrictive actions, defined as decisions that imposed undertakings, conditions, or suspension
or cancellation of registration.
Results: There were 8307 notifications. The notification rate was highest among doctors (IR = 14.5 per 1000
practitioners per year) and dentists (IR = 20.7) and lowest among nurses and midwives (IR = 2.0). One in ten
notifications resulted in restrictive action; fewer than one in 300 notifications resulted in suspension or cancellation of
registration. Compared with notifications about clinical care, the odds of restrictive action were higher for notifications
relating to health impairments (drug misuse, OR = 7.0; alcohol misuse, OR = 4.6; mental illness, OR = 4.1, physical or
cognitive illness, OR = 3.7), unlawful prescribing or use of medications (OR = 2.1) and violation of sexual boundaries
(OR = 1.7). The odds were higher where the report was made by another health practitioner (OR = 2.9) or employer
(OR = 6.9) rather than a patient or relative. Nurses and midwives (OR = 1.8), psychologists (OR = 4.5), dentists (OR = 4.7),
and other health practitioners (OR = 5.3) all had greater odds of being subject to restrictive actions than doctors.
Conclusions: Restrictive actions are the strongest measures health practitioner boards can take to protect the public
from harm and these actions can have profound effects on the livelihood, reputations and well-being of practitioners.
In Australia, restrictive actions are rarely imposed and there is variation in their use depending on the source of the
notification, the type of issue involved, and the profession of the practitioner.
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Background
Many countries entrust oversight of doctors and other
health professionals to practitioner boards. A core mis-
sion of such boards is to protect the public from unsafe
practice. Boards rely on patients, practitioners and their
peers, employers and other agencies to bring risks to
their attention and can employ a range of assessment
and investigation processes to evaluate concerns about a
practitioner’s health, performance or conduct. In cases
where a practitioner poses a risk to patient safety boards
can initiate a range of actions, including imposing condi-
tions on the practitioner’s registration or suspending
their licensure to practice. Actions that restrict ability to
practice may have profound effects on affected practi-
tioners – damaging livelihood, reputation, and poten-
tially personal well-being [1, 2]. Imposing such actions
therefore requires boards to chart a delicate course
between protecting patients from harm and respecting
the rights of practitioners [3].
Previous research has examined factors associated with
disciplinary action against doctors. Studies have com-
pared disciplined doctors with controls drawn from the
broader medical workforce [4–7], with colleagues who
were investigated or charged but not disciplined [8], and
with colleagues who incurred less serious sanctions [9].
In general, these studies identify several risk factors for
incurring disciplinary sanctions, including male sex, late
career stage, and practice in certain specialties (surgery,
obstetrics and gynecology, psychiatry, and general prac-
tice). In addition, longitudinal studies of doctors have
shown higher rates of disciplinary actions among physi-
cians who performed poorly during residency [10] and
physicians who lack specialty certification [11]. Relatively
few studies have focused these types of analyses on
nurses [12–14], and fewer still have examined pharma-
cists [15], psychologists [16], dentists [17, 18], and other
allied health professions. Moreover, this body of research
tends to be profession specific. For example, no previous
studies have directly compared doctors’ likelihood of
regulatory action with risks experienced by other health
practitioners.
In Australia, 14 health professions, including doctors,
nurses, dentists, psychologists, and pharmacists, are reg-
ulated by a unified scheme that has operated since 2010.
The scheme covers all states and territories, which cre-
ates a rare opportunity to use national, longitudinal data
to examine the incidence and outcomes of “notifications
of concern” (hereafter, “notifications”) relating to mul-
tiple professions [19]. We conducted a retrospective
cohort study of all notifications received by the national
agency over a 2 year period. We estimated the incidence
of notifications among health practitioners and tested
for associations between various characteristics of noti-
fied practitioners (e.g., age, sex, profession) and
notifications (e.g., issue type and source of notification)
and the adjudicated outcomes of these notifications, par-
ticularly restrictive actions.
Our goal was to advance understanding of how this
key regulatory regime operates. We were particularly
interested in generating information with the potential
to facilitate efficient adjudication and guide preven-
tion efforts. We hypothesized that there would be sys-
tematic differences in rates of notification between
professions, and that there would be relatively high
rates of restrictive action against practitioners from
certain professions (e.g., psychologists) and for notifi-




Australia’s system for regulating health practitioners
incorporates a nationally-consistent process for regis-
tration across 14 professions [20]. Notifications re-
garding the health, conduct, and performance of
practitioners are also consistently managed under the
National Registration and Accreditation Scheme
(Table 1), apart from two jurisdictions who operate
alternative models of co-regulation: New South Wales
(since the establishment of the scheme in July 2010)
and Queensland (since July 2014) [19]. Ten profes-
sions have been regulated by the scheme since incep-
tion (medical practitioners, nurses and midwives,
dental practitioners, psychologists, pharmacists, chiro-
practors, optometrists, osteopaths, physiotherapists,
and podiatrists). A further four joined in July 2012
(Aboriginal and Torres-Strait Islander practitioners,
Chinese medicine practitioners, medical radiation
practitioners, and occupational therapists). Most noti-
fications are made voluntarily by an individual or
organization who wishes to raise a concern about a
health practitioner. Mandatory notification by a fellow
practitioner or employer is required in certain situa-
tions, such as where a practitioner has practiced while
intoxicated by alcohol or drugs. Notifications are
lodged with the Australian Health Practitioner Regu-
lation Agency (AHPRA), before being referred to the
relevant national board (e.g., the Medical Board of
Australia, the Nursing and Midwifery Board of
Australia).
With support from AHPRA, boards assess each notifi-
cation and then initiate a more in-depth investigation in
cases where this appears necessary. A board may decide
no further action is warranted (before or after an investi-
gation), require the practitioner to undergo an assess-
ment of their health or performance, refer the matter to
another regulatory body, or take the matter to a hearing
before a tribunal.
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Final outcomes take several different forms. Non-
restrictive actions – typically a caution, reprimand or
fine – may have financial or reputational conse-
quences for practitioners but do not restrict their
registration in any way. Restrictive actions are those
which limit the practice of the profession or require
practitioners to do certain things. The restrictive
actions available are accepting an undertaking from
the practitioner related to their clinical practice (e.g.,
further training, random drug testing, counselling);
imposing specified conditions on practice (e.g., have
a chaperone present when seeing female patients);
suspending registration for a specified period; and
seeking to cancel the practitioner’s registration. In
some cases, the final decision will be made by a dis-
ciplinary tribunal rather than the board itself and
only tribunals have the power to cancel a practi-
tioner’s registration. A guiding principle of the
scheme is that restrictive actions should involve the
minimum regulatory force appropriate to manage the
risk.
Study design
Using administrative data routinely collected by
AHPRA, we identified all notifications about the health,
performance, or conduct of a health practitioner lodged
in 2011 and 2012. We then followed these notifications
for 30–54 months (through to 30 June 2015) to identify
their outcomes. We used data from the register of health
practitioners to calculate notification rates and to iden-
tify predictors of restrictive actions.
Data collection
AHPRA provided us with data on all health practitioners
registered between 1 January 2011 and 31 December
2012. This “practitioner extract” consisted of variables
indicating the period during which each practitioner was
registered; the practitioner’s age band, sex, profession,
and state or territory of practice; and the remoteness,
based on the practice location provided by the practi-
tioner [21].
AHPRA also provided a data extract relating to all
notifications lodged about registered practitioners during
the same 2-year period. This “notification extract” in-
cluded information collected at the time the notification
was lodged (e.g., lodgment date, source of notification,
primary issue raised), as well as information relating to
the ensuing adjudication (e.g., closure date, case out-
come). Anonymized, unique identifiers enabled us link
the practitioner extract to the notification extract.
Data on notifications were not available from New
South Wales (n = 188,297 practitioners). Although health
practitioners in New South Wales are subject to similar
requirements as those in other states, they are managed
through separate co-regulatory arrangements. This
means AHPRA does not hold the same kind of detailed
information about the management of these notifications
as it does for notifications from other jurisdictions. We
Table 1 Overview of notifications under the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme
Who can be subject to a notification? All registered health practitioners from 14 health professionsa
Who can make a notification? Patients or relatives, self, fellow practitioners, employers, agencies, members of
the public, complaint commissioners
When can action be taken against a health practitioner?
(ss 178, 191, 196)
A Board may take action if a practitioner:
• Has behaved in a way that is unsatisfactory
• Practices in a way that is unsatisfactory
• Has or may have an impairment
A Panel or Tribunal may take action if a practitioner:
• Has behaved in a way that constitutes unsatisfactory professional performance
• Has behaved in a way that constitutes unprofessional conduct or professional
misconduct
• Has an impairment
What actions may be taken? (ss 178, 191, 196) Non-restrictive actions
• No further action
• Referral to another body
• Caution, reprimand or fine
Restrictive actions
• Undertaking from the practitioner
• Imposition of condition on registration
• Suspension or cancellation of registration
aOur study excluded four professions that joined the national scheme late
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also excluded practitioners in the four health profes-
sions that joined the scheme in 2012 (n = 35,954) and
practitioners registered to an address outside
Australia (n = 14,576). The notifications of interest
thus came from all the other practitioners who were
registered during 2011 and 2012 (n = 349,480).
Measures
To protect confidentiality, AHPRA provided practitioners’
birth dates in 5-year bands (e.g., 1970–1974). We recoded
this variable to reflect each practitioner’s age group in
2010. We coded health professions into six categories:
doctors, nurses and midwives, psychologists, pharmacists,
dentists, and other health practitioners (chiropractors, op-
tometrists, osteopaths, physiotherapists, podiatrists, oral
health therapists, dental hygienists, dental prosthetics, and
dental auxiliaries). The primary issue involved in each
notification was originally coded into one of 149 cat-
egories. We recoded these issues into four categories
and 15 sub-categories. These were performance issues
(concerns about clinical care, poor communication,
concerns about medication, delays in access to care);
conduct issues (disruptive behavior, improper use or man-
agement of health information, non-compliance with
regulatory requirements, unlawful use or supply of medica-
tions, unfair costs or misleading advertising, breaches of
boundaries); health impairment issues (mental illness, drug
misuse, alcohol misuse, physical or cognitive illness); and
other issues.
The register of practitioners changes daily. We there-
fore used data on the dates practitioners became regis-
tered and unregistered with AHPRA to calculate
practitioners’ exposure time – the period each practi-
tioner could potentially receive a notification. For most
practitioners, their exposure time began on 1 January
2011 and ended on 31 December 2012 (when observa-
tion of notifications ceased). For practitioners whose
registration began and/or ended within this interval
(e.g., new graduates, retirees), their exposure time was
adjusted accordingly.
Analyses
We used counts and percentages to describe the charac-
teristics of notifications, including the reporting source,
the primary issue, the time taken to resolve each notifi-
cation, and the final determination. We then conducted
three separate analyses.
First, we used negative binomial regression to estimate
the incidence of notifications by practitioner profession,
age, sex, area remoteness, and jurisdiction. By comput-
ing marginal effects, derived directly from model esti-
mates [22, 23], we are able to report these findings as
adjusted incidence rates. We then performed multivari-
ate logistic regression analysis to examine the factors
associated with restrictive actions (undertaking, impos-
ition of conditions, suspension or cancellation of regis-
tration) and a sensitivity analysis examining factors
associated with any regulatory action (restrictive actions,
cautions, reprimands or fines).
All analyses were conducted using Stata 13.1 [24].
Results
Notification rates
In 2011–2012, 8307 notifications pertaining to 6920
practitioners were lodged with AHPRA. The overall rate
was 6.3 notifications per 1000 practitioners per year
(95% CI, 6.2 to 6.5).
Notification rates differed by profession, age, sex, and
jurisdiction (Table 2). After adjusting for all of the vari-
ables shown in Table 2 plus jurisdiction, dentists had the
highest rate of notifications (20.7 per 1000 practitioners
per year), followed by doctors (14.5 per 1000 practi-
tioners per year). Nurses and midwives had the lowest
rate of notifications (2.0 per 1000 practitioners per year).
Risk of notification generally increased with age –
practitioners aged ≤ 25 years were at lowest risk (2.6
per 1000 practitioners per year) and practitioners
aged 56–65 years were at highest risk (8.5 per 1000
practitioners per year). Men were at much higher risk
of notification than women (8.9 vs. 4.0 per 1000 prac-
titioners per year). Notification rates did not differ by
remoteness of practice location (P = 0.48), but did by
jurisdiction (P < 0.0001).
Source and type notifications
Nearly one-third of the notifications were lodged by pa-
tients or relatives and another 30% were lodged by state
complaint commissioners (Table 3). The next most com-
mon sources of notifications were fellow practitioners
(13.0%) and employers (9.5%).
Thirty-eight percent of notifications involved concerns
about performance, 31.5% involved concerns about con-
duct, and 5.6% involved concerns about the health of
practitioners. Among notifications about performance,
the most common issues arising were concerns about
the quality of clinical care (30.7%) and communication
(4.4%). Among notifications about conduct, allegations
of disruptive behavior were the most common (8.1%),
followed by concerns about improper use or manage-
ment of health information (7.6%) and non-compliance
with regulatory or administrative requirements (4.6%).
Alleged breaches of sexual boundaries accounted for
2.7% of notifications.
Outcomes of notifications
Approximately 36% of notifications were resolved within
3 months, 74% within 1 year and 91% within 2 years. By
the end of our follow-up period, 7898 (95%) of the
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notifications in the study sample had reached a final de-
termination. The remaining results relate to these
“closed” notifications.
For 68% (5363/7898) of closed notifications, the final
determination was to take no further action after the
Board had considered the issues raised (Fig. 1) (a deci-
sion to take no further action does not necessarily mean
that the notification was groundless: it may mean that
the threshold for regulatory action was not met or that
there is no longer a risk to the public that needs to be
managed because of actions the practitioner took during
the assessment or investigation period). Ten percent
(818/7898) of closed notifications resulted in restrictive
actions, 11% (850/7898) in a caution, reprimand or fine,
and 11% (867/7898) were referred to another official
agency (e.g., police).
Among notifications ending in restrictive actions, 38%
(308/818) involved practitioners entering a legally en-
forceable but voluntary undertaking with the board; 60%
(489/818) involved the imposition of formal conditions
on the practitioner’s registration; and 3% (21/818) in-
volved removal from practice through temporary
suspension or permanent cancellation of registration by
a tribunal. The 21 removals related to 19 different prac-
titioners, and 14 of these notifications involved conduct
issues (seven were breaches of boundaries), four in-
volved performance issues, and one involved a health
issue.
Predictors of restrictive action
The source of the notification, the primary issue of con-
cern in the notification, and the notified practitioner’s
profession were all strongly associated with the odds of a
restrictive action (Table 4, columns 2 and 3).
Compared with concerns about clinical care (the refer-
ence category), the odds of a restrictive action being
imposed were significantly higher among notifications
involving health impairments (drug misuse OR = 7.0,
alcohol misuse OR = 4.6, mental illness OR = 4.1, phys-
ical or cognitive illness OR = 3.7), unlawful use or supply
of medications (OR = 2.1), and breach of boundaries
(OR = 1.7). On the other hand, the odds of restrictive
action were significantly lower among notifications in-
volving unfair costs or misleading advertising (OR = 0.1),
Table 2 Number of notifications and adjusted notification rate per 1,000 practitioners per year
Characteristic Number of notifications n = 8307a Adjusted notification rate per 1000
practitioners per yearb
95% confidence interval P valuec
Profession <0.0001
Doctor 4504 14.5 13.9 to 15.1
Nurse and/or midwife 1537 2.0 1.9 to 2.1
Psychologist 473 7.1 6.4 to 7.7
Pharmacist 409 6.8 6.1 to 7.5
Dentist 910 20.7 18.9 to 22.5
Other health practitioner 474 4.5 4.1 to 5.0
Age in 2010 < 0.0001
≤ 25 255 2.6 2.3 to 3.0
26–35 1334 4.0 3.8 to 4.2
36–45 2104 6.4 6.1 to 6.8
46–55 2594 8.2 7.8 to 8.6
56–65 1582 8.5 8.0 to 9.0
≥ 66 438 8.2 7.2 to 9.2
Sex < 0.0001
Female 2938 4.0 3.8 to 4.1
Male 5367 8.9 8.6 to 9.2
Practice location 0.48
Major cities 6343 6.2 6.1 to 6.4
Inner/outer regional 1840 6.0 5.7 to 6.3
Remote/very remote 117 5.9 4.6 to 7.2
aSome cells do not sum to 8307 notifications because of missing data
bAdjusted for all other variables in the table and state/territory
cP value refers to evidence that the adjusted notification rates differs between categories. This test is based on the coefficients (and their standard errors) from
the negative binomial model
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delayed access to care (OR = 0.2), non-compliance with
administrative or regulatory requirements (OR = 0.5),
poor communication (OR = 0.5), and problems with the
use of health information (OR = 0.6).
Compared with notifications lodged by patients or
relatives, the odds of restrictive action were signifi-
cantly higher among notifications lodged by em-
ployers (OR = 6.9), other agencies such as a health
department (OR = 5.3), and fellow practitioners (OR =
2.9). Self-notifications also had significantly higher
odds of ending in restrictive actions (OR = 4.0); these
arise in a variety of situations, for example, a practi-
tioner may self-notify a substance abuse issue to pre-
empt notification by a third party.
The odds of restrictive action being taken in relation
to notifications against dentists (OR = 4.7) and psycholo-
gists (OR = 4.5) were more than four times higher than
in notifications against doctors, and nearly two times
higher than in notifications against nurses and midwives
(OR = 1.8). Notifications against male practitioners were
no more likely to end in restrictive actions than those
against female practitioners, nor were there differences
in the odds of restrictive action according to the remote-
ness of the notified practitioner’s practice location.
Predictors of any regulatory action
The pattern of results when the outcome was any regu-
latory action (restrictive actions, cautions, reprimands,
or fines) was broadly similar, although most ORs were
smaller than those for restrictive actions alone (Table 4,
columns 4 and 5). The notable difference was for phar-
macists. In this analysis they had odds of regulatory
action that were nearly three times that of doctors sug-
gesting that, compared with doctors, pharmacists who
were the subject of a notification were more likely to
receive cautions, reprimands, or fines.
Time to resolution
The time involved in resolving a case increased with the se-
verity of the outcome. The median time to closure for
cases that resulted in no further action was 9 months,
compared with 34 months for cases that involved any regu-
latory action, 37 months for cases resulting in restrictive
action, and 70 months for the 21 cases that resulted in
suspension or cancellation of registration. Some of these
delays fall outside of the control of AHPRA or the Boards,
and relate, for example, to time spent waiting for a coroner
or tribunal to conclude their consideration of a case.
Discussion
Health practitioner boards are pivotal institutions in the
regulation of healthcare delivery [25]. They play a critical
role in deciding who is lawfully entitled to practice and
in protecting the public from substandard practice. How
practitioner boards execute their regulatory function has
important consequences for affected practitioners [1],
the profession, and the public [2].
Main findings
This study of notifications lodged over a 2-year period
against practitioners from 10 health professions found
an overall rate of six notifications per 1000 practitioners
per year. Doctors and dental practitioners had relatively
high notification rates and nurses and midwives had
relatively low rates. Final determinations were made on
the majority of notifications within a year, although
around one in ten took more than 2 years to resolve. In
nearly 70% of cases, no further action was taken. About





Patient or relative 2741 (33.0)
Complaint commissioner 2508 (30.2)
Fellow practitioner 1079 (13.0)
Employer 789 (9.5)





Concerns about clinical care 2550 (30.7)
Poor communication 368 (4.4)
Concerns about medication 145 (1.8)
Delays in access to care 134 (1.6)
Conducta 2616 (31.5)
Disruptive behavior 672 (8.1)
Improper use or management of health information 628 (7.6)
Non-compliance (admin/regulatory requirements/fraud) 382 (4.6)
Unlawful use or supply of medications 364 (4.4)
Unfair costs or misleading advertising 349 (4.2)
Breaches of boundaries 221 (2.7)
Healtha 462 (5.6)
Mental illness 202 (2.4)
Drug misuse 116 (1.4)
Alcohol misuse 81 (1.0)
Physical/cognitive illness 63 (0.8)
Other issuea 572 (6.9)
Unknown
1460 (17.6)
acategory heading (subcategories underneath)
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10% of notifications resulted in restrictive actions, al-
most all of which involved some form of undertaking
or conditions on practice. Only 21 notifications –
about 0.3% of the total lodged – resulted in removal
from practice. Notifications from peers and em-
ployers, notifications about health problems (particu-
larly drug or alcohol problems), and notifications
against dentists and psychologists had the highest
odds of ending in restrictive actions.
Strengths and limitations
An important strength of this study is the ability to
analyze notifications from multiple jurisdictions and
multiple professions, through the use of data from Aus-
tralia’s National Registration and Accreditation Scheme.
A few previous studies have shown inter-board variation
in disciplinary decisions within a single profession [2, 26,
27], but none have compared decisions by boards regu-
lating different professions. An additional strength of the
study is its long follow-up time, which allowed us to
observe the final outcomes of the vast majority of
notifications.
The most significant limitation of the study is that we
were not able to measure a number of practitioner-level
variables that are likely to be related to the risks of regu-
latory action. These include patient volume, type of
practice, history of disciplinary actions and, for doctors,
performance issues during training and the country of
their primary medical degree. Previous studies have
identified associations between these factors and discip-
linary outcomes [10, 12, 15, 28].
Second, despite the lengthy follow-up period, 5% of
the notifications in our sample did not have final de-
cisions at the time the study data were extracted.
Cases that take longer to resolve tend to involve
more serious outcomes. Findings of serious miscon-
duct are typically made by a tribunal after a hearing,
which occurs at the end of the adjudication process,
and the tribunal’s decision in such cases may be
appealed [29]. The implication of this for our find-
ings is that we may underestimate the number of
notifications that end in restrictive actions, especially
those involving suspension or cancellation of
practice.
Third, we note that the Australian national scheme
was still in its early years at the time of this study.
Differences in decision-making between professions may
reduce over time as Boards work together to develop
more consistent approaches to the assessment and reso-
lution of notifications.
Interpretation and implications
The regulation of health practitioners in Australia has
the primary objective of protection of the public by en-
suring that only competent and ethical practitioners are
registered. Handling notifications of concern about a
practitioner’s health, conduct or performance looms as a
key role of the national multi-practitioner regulation
Fig. 1 Overview of the number of practitioners, number of notifications, and outcome of notifications
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Table 4 Multivariate predictors of restrictive actions (undertaking, imposition of conditions, suspension or cancellation of
registration) and any regulatory action (restrictive actions plus cautions, reprimands or fines)a
Restrictive actions Any regulatory action
Characteristic Odds ratio (95% CI) P value Odds ratio (95% CI) P value
Source of notification < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Patient or relative (ref.) 1.0 1.0
Complaints commissioner 1.0 (0.8 to 1.4) 1.1 (0.9 to 1.3)
Fellow practitioner 2.9 (2.2 to 3.8) 1.9 (1.5 to 2.3)
Employer 6.9 (5.1 to 9.3) 4.2 (3.3 to 5.3)
Other agency 5.3 (3.8 to 7.4) 3.2 (2.5 to 4.1)
Self 4.0 (2.6 to 6.3) 2.6 (1.8 to 3.8)
Unknown 2.2 (1.5 to 3.3) 1.4 (1.0 to 1.9)
Issue < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Performance: Concerns about clinical care (ref.) 1.0 1.0
Performance: Poor communication 0.5 (0.3 to 0.8) 0.7 (0.5 to 1.0)
Performance: Concerns about medication 1.5 (0.8 to 2.8) 2.7 (1.8 to 3.9)
Performance: Delayed access 0.2 (0.1 to 0.9) 0.5 (0.3 to 1.0)
Conduct: Disruptive behavior 0.8 (0.6 to 1.1) 0.8 (0.6 to 1.0)
Conduct: Improper use or management of health information 0.6 (0.4 to 0.9) 1.0 (0.8 to 1.3)
Conduct: Breaches of boundaries 1.7 (1.1 to 2.5) 1.8 (1.3 to 2.6)
Conduct: Non-compliance (admin/regulatory requirements/fraud) 0.5 (0.4 to 0.8) 0.7 (0.5 to 0.9)
Conduct: Unlawful use or supply of medications 2.1 (1.4 to 3.0) 2.7 (2.0 to 3.6)
Conduct: Unfair costs or misleading advertising 0.1 (0.0 to 0.2) 0.2 (0.1 to 0.3)
Health: Mental illness 4.1 (2.8 to 6.1) 2.0 (1.4 to 2.8)
Health: Drug misuse 7.0 (4.4 to 11.2) 3.4 (2.2 to 5.2)
Health: Alcohol misuse 4.6 (2.8 to 7.7) 2.5 (1.5 to 4.1)
Health: Physical/cognitive illness 3.7 (2.0 to 6.8) 1.7 (1.0 to 3.0)
Other issues 1.0 (0.7 to 1.3) 1.0 (0.8 to 1.3)
Profession < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Doctor (ref.) 1.0 1.0
Nurse and/or midwife 1.8 (1.4 to 2.4) 1.5 (1.3 to 1.9)
Psychologist 4.5 (3.2 to 6.3) 2.6 (2.0 to 3.4)
Pharmacist 0.8 (0.5 to 1.4) 3.1 (2.3 to 4.1)
Dentist 4.7 (3.5 to 6.4) 2.4 (1.9 to 3.0)
Other health practitioner 5.3 (3.8 to 7.4) 2.8 (2.1 to 3.6)
Age in 2010 0.029 0.83
≤ 25 0.9 (0.6 to 1.5) 1.1 (0.7 to 1.5)
26–35 1.0 (0.8 to 1.3) 1.1 (0.9 to 1.3)
36–45 1.0 (0.8 to 1.3) 1.1 (0.9 to 1.3)
46–55 (ref.) 1.0 1.0
56-65 1.2 (0.9 to 1.6) 1.1 (0.9 to 1.3)
≥ 66 1.9 (1.3 to 2.8) 1.2 (0.9 to 1.6)
Sex 0.59 0.079
Female (ref.) 1.0 1.0
Male 1.1 (0.9 to 1.3) 1.1 (1.0 to 1.3)
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agency, with a complex apparatus for receiving, assessing
and investigating notifications. This study suggests some
interesting lessons for other international health practi-
tioner boards.
We found that notifications to practitioner boards
about the health, conduct or performance of a health
practitioner are a rare event, and responses to notifi-
cations that involve restrictive actions, such as
conditions on or removal from practice, are rarer
still.
The probability of restrictive actions varied widely
depending on the source of the notification (with notifi-
cations from peers more likely to result in restrictive
action than those made by patients) and by profession
(with notifications about doctors less likely to result in
restrictive actions than those against other professions).
The evidence that notifications made by fellow
practitioners or employers are much more likely to
lead to restrictive action than notifications made by
patients and relatives or by complaint commissioners
(which generally respond to patient complaints [30])
is perhaps unsurprising. One possible explanation is
that peers are better positioned to recognize legitim-
ate bases for a notification than are patients [2].
Relatedly, peers may refrain from notifying in all but
the most egregious instances. A competing explan-
ation relates to the adjudication process: notifications
by peers may receive closer attention than notifica-
tions by patients. Given the increasing emphasis on
the role of patients and families in patient safety, it
would be of concern if issues raised by those on the
receiving end of care are discounted in assessment
processes dominated by peer opinion.
We found that nearly half of all notifications were
due to concerns about performance issues, yet very
few of these notifications resulted in restrictive ac-
tions. In contrast, relatively few notifications con-
cerned health impairments, but a substantially larger
proportion of them ended in restrictive actions. Part
of the explanation for this difference may relate to
issues of evidence and proof. What constitutes an
unacceptable level of performance may be more diffi-
cult to determine, both for the notifier and the adju-
dicator, than the existence of an impairment that
endangers safe care. Performance concerns inevitably
raise the specter of judging what is acceptable care,
an area where regulators (advised by members of the
profession) have always treaded warily. Professional
reticence to criticize poor care [31] and vigorous
defense lawyers likely also play a part.
Consistent with previous studies, notification rates
were higher among male practitioners and older practi-
tioners [32]. However, there was no difference between
males and females in the odds of restrictive action
once a notification was received, and there was no
trend for age.
Finally, the variation we observed between professions,
both in the rate at which notifications were made, and
the rate at which notifications ended in restrictive ac-
tions, is striking. Doctors, for example, had one of the
highest rates of notifications, but those notifications
were less likely to result in restrictive actions than in
other professions. There are several possible explana-
tions for such variation – they may be due to inter-
professional differences, such as whether substandard
care may directly cause harm (including pain), in the
underlying rate of unprofessional behaviors, in the likeli-
hood that any given episode of unprofessional behavior
will be notified, in “case mix” (i.e., the nature and legit-
imacy of notifications), and in how strictly boards re-
spond. We cannot disentangle these competing
explanations because we did not observe unprofessional
behavior directly, other than through the decisions of
boards in cases that reach them.
Conclusions
Health practitioner boards are charged with upholding
professional standards and maintaining public confi-
dence in regulated health professions. This requires
taking timely and appropriate action in response to
concerns about the health, conduct, or performance
of health practitioners. Our findings reveal significant
variation in the use of restrictive actions depending
on the source of the notification, the type of issue in-
volved, and the profession of the practitioner. Further
work is required to understand whether such varia-
tions are to be expected based on the nature and
magnitude of the risks involved, and whether restrict-
ive actions are effective in protecting the public from
a future risk of harm.
Table 4 Multivariate predictors of restrictive actions (undertaking, imposition of conditions, suspension or cancellation of
registration) and any regulatory action (restrictive actions plus cautions, reprimands or fines)a (Continued)
Remoteness 0.35 0.42
Major cities (ref.) 1.0 1.0
Inner/outer regional 1.2 (0.9 to 1.4) 1.1 (0.9 to 1.3)
Remote/very remote 0.8 (0.4 to 1.7) 0.8 (0.5 to 1.4)
aModels also adjusted for jurisdiction
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